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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Judge, Kendale Facility: Gouverneur CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 12-A-4883 
Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Board Member(s) 
who participated: 
Papers considered: 
John A. Cirando, Esq. 
101 S. Salina Street 
Suite 1010 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Syracuse, New York 13202 
07-072-18 B 
June 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-
months. 
Coppola, Davis 
Appellant's Briefrecetved November 7, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
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Appellant challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious, relying too heavily upon the serious nature of Appellant’s crime of conviction (sex 
trafficking involving a 13-year-old); (2) the Board’s decision was made in violation of applicable 
legal authority; (3) the Board “did not credit” Appellant’s remorse and insight, release plans and 
achievements; (4) the Board’s decision lacked sufficient detail; (5) the Board’s decision was made 
in violation of Appellant’s due process rights; (6) the Board did not provide sufficient weight to 
certain scores contained in Appellant’s COMPAS instrument; (7) the Board did not provide 
sufficient weight to Appellant’s receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate (EEC); and (8) 
Appellant is entitled to a de novo interview because, as was stated during the interview, the Board 
did not have his sentencing minutes. 
As to issues one and two, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a 
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if 
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273-
74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 
N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely 
within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 
N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; 
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Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 
(1st Dept. 1997).   
In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
As to the third issue, it is neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Board to consider Appellant’s 
remorse and insight relative to his crime of conviction. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 
997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018) (minimization of crimes); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 
164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018) (limited expression of remorse); Matter of 
Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007) (limited insight and 
remorse); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 
275 (2d Dept. 2002) (limited insight into why crime committed).  Insight and remorse are relevant 
not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the 
offense.  Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 
2007).  Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to insight and remorse, it 
was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of 
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 
777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)).  Also, the Board is permitted to conclude that the serious nature of 
the inmate’s offense, as well as limited insight and/or remorse, outweigh other factors.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000), aff’g 266 A.D.2d 296, 
297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 
(2017); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 
(2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Serrano v. N.Y. State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 
689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999). 
As to the fourth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
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996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in 
individualized terms and explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations: 
Appellant’s sexual acts committed against a 13-year-old girl, and his promoting her to engage in 
acts of prostitution, his poor judgment and disregard for the law, certain elevated risk scores 
contained in his COMPAS instrument, his lack of insight and remorse, and his inability to 
understand how his criminal actions impacted his young victim.  
As to the fifth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on 
parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 
50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 
N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a 
possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due 
process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
As to the sixth issue, in 2011 the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk 
and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 
259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
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the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment 
principles to “assist” in measuring an inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon 
release.  See Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of 
rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole 
release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, 
for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—
that the inmate will “live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also 
find, in its discretion, that the inmate’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society, 
or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly 
contradicts the inmate’s assertion that certain low COMPAS scores create a presumption of 
release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. 
As to the seventh issue, Appellant’s receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate (EEC) does 
not automatically guarantee his release, and it does not eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 1202, 1203, 819 
N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2006); Matter 
of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Barad v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 
96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001).  The Board may deny release to parole on a finding that 
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain 
at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of 
society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 
673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 
N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 
51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). 
 The Board took into consideration the relevant statutory factors, which included, among 
other things, the very serious nature of the sex trafficking crime, certain elevated risk scores in his 
COMPAS instrument, his lack of insight into the crime committed and its devastating impact upon 
his young victim, and the Board was not required to give each factor equal weight. See, e.g., Matter 
of Ward v. New York State Div. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1375, 40 N.Y.S.3d 803 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017).   
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As to the eighth issue, where the Board had made good faith efforts to obtain the sentencing 
minutes from the sentencing court, but was unsuccessful, and Appellant failed to produce 
documentation that the sentencing minutes contained a recommendation as to the suitability of his 
possible release to parole supervision, the Board’s failure to consider the sentencing minutes did 
not prejudice Appellant and amounted to harmless error. Matter of Matul v. Chair of the New York 
State Board of Parole, 69 A.D.3d 1196 (3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Midgette v. New York State 
Division of Parole, 70 A.D. 3d 1039 (2d Dept. 2010).  Furthermore, when the sentencing minutes 
are unavailable at the time of the interview, Appellant is not entitled to a presumption that the 
sentencing minutes contained a favorable parole recommendation.  Matter of Geraci v. Evans, 76 
A.D.3d 1161, 907 N.Y.S.2d 726 (3d Dept. 2010); Matter of Midgette v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1039, 895 N.Y.S.2d 530 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of Lebron v. Alexander, 68 
A.D.3d 1476, 892 N.Y.S.2d 579 (3d Dept. 2009). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
